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FOREIGN JURISDICTIONAL ALGEBRA and KIOBEL v. 
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM:  FOREIGN CUBED AND 











 In its recent term, the United States Supreme Court 
appears to have decided unanimously in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum1 that U.S. federal courts cannot hear and decide 
foreign cubed cases.  These are cases with three fundamental 
foreign elements:  in which a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign 
defendant for acts committed on foreign soil.2  Justice Breyer 
in a concurring opinion joined by three other justices and 
Justice Kennedy in another concurring opinion seem to have 
left the jurisdictional door ajar, at least for foreign squared 
cases in which only two of the three foreign factors exist.  This 
paper analyzes the Kiobel case’s four opinions and considers 
possible foreign squared scenarios.3 
 
 This international law case raises the jurisdictional 
question, what can the courts of one country do in response to 
multinational corporate support of government-sponsored 
atrocities in another country?  The issue is whether a state4 can  
 
_________________ 
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Pace University, Lubin 
School of Business 
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decide the legal fate of foreign corporations for acts against 
foreign nationals in a foreign country.  Specifically, in this 
case, under the United States Alien Tort Statute (ATS),5 can 
United 
States federal courts adjudicate a civil suit brought by Nigerian 
citizens (Kiobel et al.) who now reside in the U.S. against 
corporations incorporated in foreign countries (here the 
Netherlands,6 England,7 and Nigeria8) for allegedly aiding and 
abetting atrocities by the Nigerian government in Nigeria?9 
 
I.  EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION:  GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES 
 
 Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and 
decide a case.  To have that authority, a court must have 
jurisdiction both over the subject matter of the case and over its 
parties.  Extraterritorial jurisdiction is particularly problematic 
because it is the assertion of the power to make legal 
judgments for acts outside the geographic territory of the 
court’s government.  Such a claim is difficult when the 
territory is international such as on “the high seas” and in the 
territory of no country.  It is even more complicated when the 
disputed acts are alleged to have occurred in another 
government’s geographic territory and, therefore, there may be 
conflicting jurisdictional claims.  
 
 A court might exercise jurisdiction on a number of 
bases, but, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is 
presumptuous for one country to impliedly claim that it can 
provide justice better than another country, especially when the 
other country has closer connections to the case.  From the 
perspective of serving one’s own citizens, why should money 
from government coffers be used to provide judicial services to 
citizens of other countries?  If the rationale is that it serves the 
country’s diplomatic interest, shouldn’t the country’s political 
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branches, that is, its executive and legislative branches, make 
that decision rather than its judicial branch?  If the rationale is 
concern for international human rights, shouldn’t an 
international body make that decision?10 
 
 Extraterritorial11 jurisdiction may be based on bilateral 
or multilateral agreements, or upon one or more of the 
following basic principles for international jurisdiction.12 
1. Territoriality:  over acts within a state’s geographic 
territory with extraterritorial effect 
2. Nationality:  over citizens of one’s state who cause 
harm outside that state’s territory 
3. Protective:  to protect one’s state from harm resulting 
from extraterritorial acts 
4. Passive personality:  to protect one’s citizens outside 
the state’s territory 
5. Universality:  to prosecute acts seen universally as 
crimes, regardless of where they occurred13 
 
II.  ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
 
 The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), adopted in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789,14 states 
 
  The district courts shall have original 
  jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
  for a tort only, committed in violation of  
  the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
  States 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 :  US Code – Section 1350:  Alien’s action 
for tort15 
 
 It had rarely been used for two centuries until the 
Second Circuit in the 1980 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala16 and 
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the United States Supreme Court in the 2004 case of Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain17 decided that private parties could bring 
claims under “federal common law.”18  The original question in 
this case was whether the ATS substantively covers the acts 
claimed, but re-argument was ordered on the jurisdictional 
question of “whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in 
the territory of a foreign sovereign.”19 
 
 Sometimes what is omitted from an opinion is as 
important as what is included.  The Second Circuit had 
dismissed the Kiobel complaint on the grounds that “the law of 
nations does not recognize corporate liability.”20  This issue 
was not even mentioned in any of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Kiobel opinions; in other words, corporate liability was 
assumed arguendo.  This is an important point.  It means that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided that corporations may 
not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute.  That result would 
have established a barrier against suits based upon ATS 
jurisdiction against all corporations, domestic or foreign, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff, defendant, and location of 
the acts in question were foreign.   
 
III.  FOREIGN CUBED CASES:  KIOBEL SUPREME 
    COURT OPINIONS 
 
 Despite unanimity as to the result by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, four 
separate opinions were reported.  Therefore, predicting how 
this case will function as a precedent under stare decisis is 
somewhat complicated.  
 
A. Opinion of the Court21 
 
 Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of 
the Court, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony 
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Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, Jr.  Roberts 
wrote “[t]he question presented is whether and under what 
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the 
Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.”22 
 
 Kiobel et al. argued that the ATS does indeed provide 
for extraterritorial U.S. jurisdiction under “[t]he law of 
nations,” otherwise known as “customary international law,”23 
under circumstances such as aiding and abetting such acts as 
“(1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) 
torture and cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; 
(5) violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and 
association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”24  
However, the majority decided that there is no extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, regardless of the existence of the circumstances 
above, in foreign cubed cases, that is, when there are three 
basic foreign elements, a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign 
defendant for acts committed on foreign soil.  It based its 
decision on “[t]he presumption against extraterritorial 
application.”25  Under this technical principle of statutory 
construction, a domestic statute does not have extraterritorial 
application unless such application is clearly indicated.26  This 
approach avoids the foreign affairs implications of unintended 
conflicts with foreign laws.27  And it reflects the desire of the 
judicial branch to leave foreign policy decisions with “the 
political branches.”28  The majority acknowledged that the 
language of the ATS does not hint at a territorial limitation of 
its jurisdiction, yet here it deferred to this often ignored 
presumption regardless.  In Sosa, by contrast, extraterritorial 
application was apparently assumed by the Supreme Court, 
with jurisdictional concern for foreign policy implications 
limited to a narrow interpretation of the relevant law of nations 
as “specific, universal, and obligatory.”29 
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 The majority did consider possible grounds that might 
rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of the 
ATS including:   
1. Text of the statute -- construction of the ATS.  But if 
found nothing explicitly demanding its extraterritorial 
application.30 
2. Transitory torts doctrine -- that a tort, regardless of 
where it occurred, can provide for jurisdiction over a 
civil action wherever subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction can be obtained.31 But observed that this 
doctrine may have been applicable in Sosa where the 
grounds were U.S. law, but not in this case where the 
law was foreign law.32 
3. Stare decisis – judicial history and three applicable 
offenses referred to in prior cases to assert 
extraterritorial application of the ATS, “violations of 
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”33 But argues that “[t]he first 
two offenses have no necessary extraterritorial 
application”34 and that one of four contemporary cases35 
were extraterritorial.  The third offense, “piracy,” 
according to the majority, typically occurs “on the high 
seas” and, therefore, outside of any country’s territory,36 
where no country has territorial jurisdiction.  Therefore, 
foreign policy consequences are “less direct” and the 
offense of “piracy” does not justify jurisdiction over 
acts on foreign soil, as in this case.37 
4. Nationality principle -- the majority read a 1795 
opinion by Attorney General William Bradford as an 
ambiguous38 nationality principle case, restricting 
jurisdiction to U.S. citizens for acts on foreign soil.39  In 
this case the defendant corporations were not U.S. 
citizens.  
5. Legislative history -- analysis of the intent of the 
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drafters of the Alien Tort Statute.  The majority quoted 
an opinion forty years after passage of the ATS as proof 
that its authors did not intend “to make the United 
States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement 
of international norms”40 and claimed that imputing 
legislative intent to apply the ATS to acts in foreign 
countries would be “implausible.”41 
 
 Therefore, the majority ruled that since the ATS is a 
domestic statue and extraterritorial application is not clearly 
indicated for this type of case, application of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application dictated that the ATS did not 
have extraterritorial application in this foreign cubed case.   
 
 Justice Roberts ended his opinion by raising the specter 
of unintended “serious foreign policy consequences,”42 
including a tit-for-tat backlash of lawsuits against “our 
citizens” in the courts of other nations for “alleged violations of 
the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere 
else in the world.”43  This seems to be the kind of foreign 
policy analysis Justice Roberts, earlier in his opinion, reserved 
to the other “political” branches of government.   
 
B.  Concurring Opinion: Kennedy44 
 
 Justice Kennedy is often the “swing vote” in the current 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 decisions.  Therefore, even though 
this case was unanimous decision and Kennedy joined the 
opinion of the court, it is important to pay attention to his 
additional independent concurring opinion as it may be crucial 
in deciding a future extraterritorial jurisdiction foreign squared 
case or possibly even in foreign cubed cases with different 
facts, such as no legal recourse elsewhere.   
 
 Kennedy asserted that questions here are left open and 
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that this case is not the final chapter on the ATS45 and, 
especially, his concern for a legal response to human rights 
abuses outside the United States.  “Many serious concerns with 
respect to human rights abuses committed abroad have been 
addressed by Congress in statutes such as the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) [not including cases against 
corporations] …, Other cases may arise with allegations of 
serious violations of international law principles protecting 
persons.”46 
 
C. Concurring Opinion: Alito47 
 
 Justices Samuel Alito, Jr. and Clarence Thomas agreed 
with C.J. Roberts that the case should be decided on the narrow 
grounds that, in an ATS case with “claims [that] touch and 
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application”48 and for there to be extraterritorial 
federal jurisdiction.  However, Justice Alito wrote an additional 
concurring opinion, joined by Thomas, stating a preference for 
a broader isolationist49 standard, affirming the presumption 
against extraterritorial application by using a “focus’ of 
congressional concern” test and re-asserting the Sosa 
requirements, with a statutory construction emphasizing the 
legislative intent of the 1789 authors of the ATS.50 
 
D.  Concurring Opinion: Breyer51 
 
 Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Ruther Bader 
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, concurred with 
the Court’s judgment, but not its reasoning.  They rejected 
Roberts’s reliance on “the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.”52  Instead, “guided in part by principles and 
practices of foreign relations law,” they would adopt ATS 
jurisdiction based upon territoriality, nationality, or protective 
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principles:  “where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil 
[territoriality] (2)  the defendant is an American national, 
[nationality] or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest” 
[protective].53  Key is Justice Breyer’s definition of important 
American national interests as including “a distinct interest in 
preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free 
of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other 
common enemy of mankind.”54  Breyer, like Alito, quoted 
Sosa, but more expansively, focusing on its general 
principles.55  However, the facts in Kiobel did not meet any of 
these standards and, therefore, federal court jurisdiction should 
not be granted here.  
 
 A basic distinction among the approaches of Breyer, 
Roberts, and, especially, Alito, is their jurisprudence, 
specifically their approaches to statutory construction.  
Whereas Alito interpreted the ATS as limited to whatever was 
of concern in 1789, and Roberts constrained the ATS with a 
restrictive presumption against extraterritoriality principle, 
Breyer referred to the Sosa characterizations of the legislative 
history as providing “18th-century paradigms” for judges to 
fashion “a cause of action” “based on the present-day law of 
nations.”56  Breyer, in his evolutionary judicial approach, noted 
that the purpose of the ATS was to grant a cause of action 
where none existed before and, therefore, frames the key 
question as “Who are today’s pirates?” providing a remedy to 
those harmed “when those activities take place abroad.”57 
 
 Breyer rejected application of the “presumption against 
extraterritoriality” to the ATS, a statute enacted “with ‘foreign 
matters’ in mind.”58  He also rejected a legal “distinction 
between piracy at sea and similar cases on land,” noting, for 
example, that crimes on a flagged ship are within the 
jurisdiction of that nation as though they were on land.59 
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 Justice Breyer’s core position on the role of the courts 
concerning international human rights violations is that “just as 
a nation that harbored pirates provoked the concern of other 
nations in past centuries…so harboring “common enemies of 
all mankind” provokes similar concerns today.”60  Thus 
Breyer’s presumption is different from that of Roberts; “I 
would assume that Congress intended the statute’s 
jurisdictional reach to match the statute’s underlying 
substantive grasp.”61 
 
 To help determine the proper jurisdictional scope of the 
ATS, Breyer referred to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law, including its Section 402 jurisdiction principles 
of territoriality,62 nationality,63 protective,64 and, universality.65  
At the same time, Breyer accepted jurisdictional limitations, 
such as exhaustion of legal remedies, forum non conveniens, 
and comity, as well as courts “giving weight to the views of the 
Executive Branch.”66 
 
 Breyer then cited, with apparent approval, two lower 
federal court decisions that accepted ATS jurisdiction where 
the alleged conduct violated well-established international law 
norms and the defendant was present in the United States when 
the suit was filed, although both plaintiff and defendant were 
foreign nationals and the acts occurred outside of the U.S.67  
Breyer observed that such an approach “is consistent with 
international law and foreign practice” citing foreign authors 
and courts that accept jurisdiction of cases where the acts 
occurred abroad.68 
 
 Breyer observed that if Congress was concerned as to 
the judicial interpretation of the extraterritorial reach of the 
ATS by federal courts since Filartiga in 1980 or since Sosa in 
2004, it could have limited the substantive or jurisdictional 
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reach of the ATS by legislation, but it did not.  
 
 Therefore, Breyer concluded that his approach is 
consistent with Sosa and should not cause concern that other 
countries will respond by “hal[ing] our citizens into their courts 
for alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the 
United States, or anywhere else in the world.69 
 
 However, it would “reach too far to say” that there are 
grounds for jurisdiction based on the facts of this particular 
case – where foreign nationals sue two foreign corporations 
with minimal presence in the United States (a New York City 
office owned by an affiliated company) for acts such as torture 
they allegedly helped but did not directly engage in.70 
 
IV.  FOREIGN SQUARED CASES:  POST-KIOBEL 
 
 Once again, one of the most important elements of 
majority opinion is what was omitted.  Among the significant 
questions left open is whether there might be jurisdiction under 
principles of nationality or territoriality.  The majority opinion 
apparently closed U.S. courts to cased based on ATS 
jurisdiction when the case is a “foreign cubed” case, that is, 
where “a foreign plaintiff is suing a foreign defendant for acts 
committed on foreign soil.”71  However, whether federal courts 
have ATS jurisdiction over “foreign squared” cases, where one 
of these three elements is domestic, that is, either the plaintiff 
or the defendant is a U.S. national (nationality) or the act is 
committed in the U.S. (territoriality) remains unclear.72   
  
 It is possible that as many as seven of the justices, 
excluding Justices Alito and Thomas as a result of their broad 
concurring opinion, would decide that at least some foreign 
squared cases that “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States -- with sufficient force” overcome the 
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presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction.73  However, 
this is not an easy reading of Robert’s opinion.  
 
 Four justices, Breyer and the three justices joining him, 
seem squarely behind extraterritorial jurisdiction in some 
foreign squared cases.  But four does not a majority make; 
therefore such jurisdiction appears to depend on Justice 
Kennedy.  The possibility of U.S. federal court extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is enhanced by Kennedy’s dicta in his opinion.  
 
  Other cases may arise with allegations 
  of serious violations of international 
  law principles protecting persons, cases 
  covered neither by the TVPA [Torture 
  victim Protection Act] nor by the  
  reasoning and holding of today’s case;  
  and in those disputes the proper  
  implementation of the presumption 
  against extraterritorial implementation 
  application may require some further  
  elaboration and explanation.  
 
 Even though the vote was unanimous against 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case, Kennedy’s vote may be 
the swing vote in a foreign squared case, or even in a case 
based upon non-ATS jurisdiction.  And that might well focus 
on whether the United States should judicially ignore the 
equivalent of modern-day piracy, possibly including not only 
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 The Kiobel case is likely to result in continued efforts to 
bring foreign squared cases against multinational corporations 
under ATS jurisdiction and even to bring foreign cubed cases 
under other theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction.75 
 
 If there were an international court with jurisdiction 
over alleged civil violations of the law of nations anywhere in 
the world against individuals and business organizations, this 
issue would be moot.  As long as such a court remains a pipe 
dream, the majority of the United States Supreme Court may 
be prepared to stand idly by, with our political branches 
allowing grave human rights violations to occur against 
persons in foreign countries who then have no legal redress for 
their grievances.76  But that might be a topic for an 
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